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REPRINT ARTICLE
The short answer is “yes” for the most 
part with respect to customer assets held in 
a customer segregated account in the United 
States but major changes to the procedures 
and policies now in place are needed to pro-
vide greater customer protection safeguards, 
especially in connection with assets held out-
side the United States in CFTC Regulation 
30.71 secured amount accounts, regarding 
trading on non-U.S. futures exchanges.
Most mystery authors normally wait un-
til the last few pages of the last chapter to 
provide the final clues and solve the mys-
tery. This is, however, a different mystery 
story even if it’s filled with suspense, exciting 
themes and horror. And for those who do 
not believe that the role that segregated and 
secured amount funds play in today’s global 
futures markets is not mysterious and chal-
lenging, then they must have slept through 
the period of the last two weeks in September 
and most of October. What we all believed 
were the rules to be applied in the event of 
an FCM’s bankruptcy were all interpreted 
differently by the various global exchanges 
and clearing houses. Some clearing houses, 
like EUREX Clearing AG, LCH Clearnet 
SA, the CME Clearing House, ICE Clear US 
and The Clearing Corporation, acted admi-
rably and professionally while others acted 
in a manner that was not necessarily in the 
best interests of futures customers.2 This 
article will explain what many of us in the 
futures industry understand to be the role 
of customer segregated and secured amount 
accounts, then explain what occurred after 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the parent 
company of Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”), 
filed for Chapter 11 protection and then 
provide several recommendations of best 
practices that this global industry should 
now consider. Since the brokerage firms to-
day are truly global in their customer and 
product base, any future solution must be a 
global approach.
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Introduction
With the demise of Bear Stearns Securities 
(“Bear”) in March 2008 and now the bankruptcy 
of LBI, many futures customers have raised seri-
ous questions and concerns regarding how and 
whether their funds held by a futures commis-
sion merchant (“FCM”) are protected under such 
circumstances.3 Similarly, given the recent credit 
crisis, the government loans provided to Ameri-
can International Group (“AIG”), the acquisition 
of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, the $700 
billion bailout approved by Congress and numer-
ous other financial-related matters, customers of 
broker-dealers (“BD”), insurance companies and 
banks have raised similar concerns. Not to under-
estimate the importance of insolvencies involv-
ing these other financial institutions, this article 
will only address the laws, regulations and poli-
cies that impact futures customers globally under 
such circumstances.4
Rules Governing Futures Accounts 
at an FCM
Substantial financial safeguards and customer 
protections exist within the futures industry that 
are designed to protect customer funds in the 
event of an FCM bankruptcy. Assets held in a fu-
tures account at an FCM are protected and gov-
erned specifically by applicable laws and CFTC 
regulations that require the segregation of cash 
and collateral deposited by customers in conjunc-
tion with their futures trading. Pursuant to the 
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”)5 and appli-
cable CFTC regulations6, an FCM, must maintain 
its futures customer assets in at least two different 
types of customer fund accounts (e.g., segregated 
and secured amount accounts) and may use a 
third type (e.g., a non-regulated account), each of 
which have different priority rights in the event of 
the FCM’s insolvency.
The three types of customer fund accounts used 
by an FCM are: 
1. SEGREGATED FUNDS: The first such ac-
count, established pursuant to Section 4d(a)
(2) of the CEA7 and CFTC Rule 1.20, is re-
ferred to as the “customer segregated funds 
account”. It holds the assets of all custom-
ers (U.S. and non-U.S.) deposited in conjunc-
tion with transactions on all U.S. futures 
markets. All customer assets are required 
to be held only in accounts maintained at 
custodial banks and other permitted finan-
cial institutions, including other FCMs and 
clearing houses that are registered with the 
CFTC as “derivatives clearing organiza-
tions” (DCOs). All customer segregated ac-
counts are required to be clearly identified 
as segregated pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.20. 
These segregated funds are not permitted to 
be commingled with the FCM’s proprietary 
funds or used to finance its futures or bro-
ker-dealer businesses. The amounts held in 
the segregated funds accounts are calculated 
daily as required by CFTC Rule 1.32, and 
the FCM must take immediate action in the 
unlikely event that there is ever a shortfall in 
its segregated funds accounts. This daily cal-
culation must be completed by each FCM by 
not later than noon on the next business day. 
However, the customer segregated required 
amount needs to be in a good control loca-
tion8 the night before. Otherwise, the FCM 
is deemed to be “under segregated”, and, if 
the FCM is “under-segregated”, this must be 
reported promptly to the CFTC and its re-
spective DSRO.9 Given this same-day deposit 
requirement, most large FCMs will deposit a 
large amount of their own capital in the cus-
tomer segregated account to ensure that such 
accounts are never “under-segregated”. This 
capital infusion can amount to several hun-
dred million dollars, depending on the total 
amount held in the segregation pool. 
2. SECURED AMOUNT FUNDS: The second 
type of account, governed by CFTC Rule 
30.7, is known as the “customer secured 
amount account” and holds the assets of U.S. 
residents deposited in conjunction with their 
transactions on non-U.S. futures markets. 
These funds are also required to be held in 
accounts at banks and other permitted finan-
cial institutions, including non-U.S. clearing 
houses and members of non-U.S. exchanges, 
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provided such non-U.S. clearing houses and 
non-U.S. member firms are deemed to be a 
“good secured” location. Like segregated 
funds, secured amount funds are not permit-
ted to be commingled with the FCM’s pro-
prietary assets and are calculated daily and 
represent 100% of that day’s customer re-
quirements.10 FCMs are permitted to secure 
more than the minimum requirement stated 
above and can elect to deposit all funds used 
to trade on non-U.S. markets by all of its cli-
ents, including foreign domiciled clients. Like 
segregated funds as noted above, the calcu-
lation for the secured amount requirements 
must be completed by the following morning 
but the secured amount requirement must be 
deposited in a good secured location the night 
before or the FCM will be deemed to be in 
default.11 As noted above with customer seg-
regated accounts, most large FCMs will also 
deposit their own capital in a secured amount 
account to prevent any under-funding from 
occurring
3. NON-REGULATED FUNDS: The third 
type of account, called the “Non-Regulated 
Customer Credit” calculation, contains the 
assets (cash and open trade equity) of non-
U.S. customers deposited in conjunction with 
transactions on non-U.S. futures markets if 
such amounts are not included in the secured 
amount account as noted above.12 An FCM, 
also registered as a broker-dealer, may use 
this third account type, which is governed 
by Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) Rule 15c3-3. The amounts held in 
this account reflect the total of the credit bal-
ances calculated for each individual account 
owed by the FCM to its non-U.S. customers 
for transactions on non-U.S. futures markets 
less any deposits of cash or securities held 
with a clearing organization or correspon-
dent clearing broker.13 Any amounts held in a 
non-regulated account are not covered by the 
provisions of the Securities Investor Protec-
tion Act (“SIPA”).
Each “bucket”, noted above, contains funds 
used by customers to margin the relevant futures 
products, with the difference being whether the 
futures products are traded on U.S. or non-U.S. 
futures markets and, for non-US markets only, 
whether the customer is a U.S. or a non-U.S. en-
tity.
In addition to the segregation and secured 
amount requirements, CFTC regulations restrict 
where client funds may be placed. CFTC Rule 
1.20 requires the FCM to maintain customer 
segregated funds, whether in the form of cash or 
collateral, either with a clearinghouse of a U.S. 
futures exchange registered with the CFTC as a 
DCO, in a customer segregated account with a 
bank or with another FCM. In connection with 
its custodial arrangement, the FCM must obtain 
what is known as a “segregation acknowledge-
ment letter”, commonly known as a “seg. waiver 
letter”, in which the respective custodial bank or 
FCM acknowledges and agrees that all assets de-
posited in this segregated account are for the sole 
benefit of the FCM’s futures customers and are 
not subject to the claims of any of the FCM’s cred-
itors, including that bank or FCM, respectively. 
Similar letters must also be obtained for the Rule 
30.7 secured amount account and the Rule 15c3-3 
non-regulated account at the respective custodial 
bank. All customer assets are therefore held at all 
times in these accounts at the respective custodial 
bank or FCM, in accounts at the various clearing 
houses or with other clearing brokers that act as 
clearing brokers on the various exchanges around 
the globe on behalf of the FCM.
RECOMMENDATION #1:  While the 
CFTC does not specifically require the use of 
non-regulated accounts, as this is primarily an 
SEC requirement for broker-dealers, the CFTC 
should now prohibit the use of non-regulated 
accounts by an FCM, that is also registered as a 
broker-dealer, and require that all funds held by 
an FCM to margin non-U.S. futures, whether they 
be for the benefit of a U.S. customer or a non-U.S. 
customer, be held in a 30.7 Customer Secured 
Amount Account. This prohibition will prevent 
any misappropriation of futures customer funds 
held in a 15c3-3 account as such accounts could 
arguably be deemed to fall outside the protections 
afforded by CFTC regulations 1.20 and 30.7.
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An FCM is also required by CFTC regulations 
to properly account for and calculate on a daily 
basis both the amount that it is required to hold in 
segregation and the amount that actually is in its 
customer segregated accounts.14 Any deficiencies 
in the amounts required must be remedied and re-
ported immediately to the appropriate regulators. 
Most large FCMs deposit a substantial amount 
of their own capital in the customer segregated 
account to provide excess funds in the event a fu-
tures customer does not timely meet its margin 
requirements. This capital infusion may also be 
used to satisfy customer claims in the event of 
the FCM’s insolvency. Similarly, to provide ad-
ditional protections to its customers, the FCM 
must report, in accordance with applicable CFTC 
regulations, to the appropriate regulators within 
24 hours if its net capital falls below the “early 
warning” level and must promptly add additional 
capital to bring its net capital above this level.15 
In the event of the FCM’s bankruptcy,16 futures 
customer assets are normally protected except as 
described below. First, assuming no material fu-
tures customer-related default exists or was the 
cause of the FCM’s bankruptcy (e.g., the insol-
vency was the direct result of a non-futures cus-
tomer or transaction), a bankruptcy filing should 
have no material impact on customers’ assets 
held in the three aforementioned accounts. Under 
such circumstances, each account should contain 
100% of the required amounts and should be 
transferred back to customers in an orderly fash-
ion. An FCM bankruptcy would be administered 
under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 
which contains specific provisions for the protec-
tion of customers in the event of an FCM’s insol-
vency. Under Part 190 of the CFTC’s rules, the 
bankruptcy trustee would have the responsibility 
of returning the custodied assets back to each fu-
tures customer. Creditors of the FCM’s bankrupt 
estate would have no claim to any of the assets 
held in these three accounts. The assets would be 
held solely for the benefit of the FCM’s futures 
customers. 
If, on the other hand, the FCM’s bankruptcy 
resulted from a futures customer’s failure to de-
liver the required margin for its futures trading 
positions, and the default was greater than all of 
the shareholder equity of the FCM, then each of 
the three accounts held at the custodian bank (or 
an FCM) would be treated independently of each 
other. Customers’ assets held in one of these three 
accounts may not be used to satisfy any shortfalls 
in another account (e.g., the amounts held in the 
segregated account at the respective custodial bank 
or at a DCO may not be used to cover a shortfall 
held in the non-regulated account). However, as 
noted in greater detail below, a clearing house, 
including a DCO, may apply a clearing member 
firm’s customer assets that are on deposit with 
that respective clearing house to satisfy margin 
amounts owed to the clearing house by that clear-
ing member firm (and that clearing member firm 
only) for its customer accounts. In other words, 
customer assets held by a clearing house may not 
be used to cover a shortfall in the FCM’s “house” 
account nor may assets held at one clearing house 
be applied to cover a shortfall at another clearing 
house unless a cross-margining arrangement ex-
ists with respect to the two clearing houses.
The assets of an FCM’s futures customers, 
which trade on the U.S. futures markets, are nor-
mally wired directly by those customers into the 
customer segregated account at the respective 
custodial bank. The custodian bank would typi-
cally maintain different segregated accounts to 
hold cash and any non-cash collateral, such as 
U.S. Treasury bills, respectively. This firewall be-
tween the bank and the FCM provides important 
protections to the FCM’s futures customers. As 
noted above, the assets held in these accounts at 
the bank do not fall within the bankrupt estate 
and are reserved for payment to customers if the 
FCM files for bankruptcy. If the bank mishandles 
futures customers’ assets held with the FCM, its 
full shareholder capital should stand behind the 
accounts. 
If the FCM is required by an exchange to send 
cash or collateral to a DCO to meet its custom-
ers’ initial or variation margin requirements, the 
required amounts are typically sent via wire trans-
fer from the customer segregated account at the 
respective custodial bank or FCM to another cus-
tomer segregated account held in the name of the 
DCO for the benefit of the FCM’s futures custom-
ers. Therefore, at all times, assets of the FCM’s fu-
Futures & Derivatives Law Report
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tures customers, who trade on U.S. futures mar-
kets, are held in a customer segregated account 
at the FCM’s or the DCO’s custodial bank. Simi-
larly, assets that need to be transferred to clearing 
brokers or clearing houses outside the U.S. are 
also sent directly from the 30.7 Secured Amount 
Account at the bank to the required good secured 
location. 
Investments of Futures Customer 
Assets
There are also customer protections relating 
to the types of permissible investments that an 
FCM may make with customer assets held by the 
FCM. Pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.25, the FCM is 
permitted to invest its futures customers’ assets in 
a limited number of permissible investments.17 In 
today’s marketplace, the most commonly used in-
vestment product are money market mutual funds 
that meet the requirements of CFTC Rule 1.25 
and SEC Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Compa-
ny Act of 1940 (the “1940 Act”). However, any 
investment loss that may be incurred as a result 
of such investment must be borne solely by the 
FCM; its futures customers assume no such in-
vestment risk.18 This concern has been heightened 
recently by The Reserve Fund which lost a sub-
stantial amount of its investment assets through 
its purchase of commercial paper held in the name 
of Lehman Brothers and AIG, causing the fund to 
“break the buck”.19 Also, the FCM must receive 
an acknowledgement from each money market 
fund that the amounts invested by the FCM on 
behalf of its customers with the respective money 
market fund may not be applied to any creditor 
of the FCM. This is similar to the segregation 
acknowledgement letter received by FCMs from 
their custodial banks, as noted above.
RECOMMENDATION #2: Given the recent 
issues that have arisen with respect to money 
market funds as well as other investments that 
are permissible under CFTC Regulation 1.25, the 
CFTC should review CFTC Regulation 1.25 and 
U.S. clearing houses should review their respec-
tive rules regarding deposits made by their clear-
ing member firms, such as the IEF2 Program at the 
CME Clearing House, to determine what chang-
es, if any, are now needed to these regulations and 
programs. In particular, they should codify that 
any FCM or clearing member firm that invests in 
money market funds or other permissible invest-
ments under CFTC Regulation 1.25 on behalf of 
their futures customers will be held liable for any 
losses that may occur from such investments and 
should consider setting guidelines relating to such 
investments. For example, one such guideline, a 
portfolio diversification guideline, may state that 
no FCM should invest more than a particular per-
centage of its customer assets in any one money 
market fund or other permissible investment. 
Also, the money market funds that can be used 
for such investments by FCMs should be required 
to accept redemptions on a daily basis and pay 
such redemption proceeds within a certain time 
frame, e.g., 24 hours, with only one exception 
permitted, that is, to do so would cause the fund 
to “break the buck”. 
Good Risk Management Practices
The risk management disciplines applied by 
FCMs and other participants in the futures in-
dustry are another significant source of customer 
protection. To provide the greatest protection to 
its futures customers, the FCM must exercise a 
strong risk management practice. This requires 
establishing a proper trade or credit risk amount 
for each of its client futures accounts, monitor-
ing such levels frequently and receiving current 
on-going financial information from each futures 
customer. This is especially true for those custom-
ers who trade an account (or a combination of ac-
counts pursuant to an aggregation concept) that 
results in a large percentage of the open interest 
of any single commodity being owned or con-
trolled by a client. Also, while a DCO normally 
sets adequate and proper initial margin levels, 
typically involving a one day, two standard devia-
tion test, an FCM should also analyze each of its 
large futures customers, especially those, as noted 
above, who hold positions that represent a large 
percentage of the open interest, and apply a more 
conservative variation risk (“VAR”) or standard 
deviation (“SD”) analysis, such as a five day, two 
SD test, on a daily basis.
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If one of the FCM’s customers were to fail to 
meet its margin requirements in a timely manner, 
which is typically a T+1 standard,20 that FCM 
would be required to step in and use its own capi-
tal to ensure that other customers are not affected 
and to satisfy that FCM’s obligations as a clearing 
broker. As noted above, most large FCMs main-
tain a significant amount of their own capital in 
the customer segregated and secured amount ac-
counts to provide a first line of protection in the 
event a customer fails to meet its daily margin re-
quirements. Applicable laws and regulations pro-
hibit that FCM from using the assets of its other, 
non-defaulting futures customers to meet the ob-
ligations of a defaulting client. However, as not-
ed above, this does not prevent a clearing house 
from applying assets held in a clearing member’s 
customer segregated fund account to cover any 
deficit that may result from a shortfall in the cus-
tomer segregated account held on the books of 
that clearing house.
Role of a DCo
DCOs also impose important financial safe-
guards that are intended to ensure financial safety 
to the markets. Let’s assume, for purposes of this 
article, that the FCM and its foreign affiliates are 
a clearing member of most of the major global 
futures exchanges. The exchange clearing house 
(referred to in the U.S. as a DCO) stands as the 
guarantor between its clearing members and rep-
resents the buyer and seller of every futures con-
tract (“the buyer to every seller and the seller to 
every buyer”). As such, the clearing houses estab-
lish and enforce strict financial requirements for 
their clearing members to minimize the likelihood 
of, and the consequences of, a default by one of 
the parties to a futures transaction. 
In the event of a default by a clearing member, 
the following resources are typically available to 
a DCO. First, the exchange memberships and 
shares held by a defaulting clearing member and 
all the margin supporting the positions held in its 
“house” account at the clearing house may be 
used to cover any shortfall in that clearing mem-
ber firm’s “customer segregated funds” account 
at the clearing house. Second, each clearing house 
requires its clearing members to make deposits to 
the clearing house’s Guaranty Fund, also known 
as a Surety Fund, to provide additional, back-up 
capital protections to the clearing house in the 
event of a customer default. The amount deposit-
ed by each clearing member firm typically is based 
on a formula based on the volume and overnight 
margin requirements maintained by that clearing 
member firm. At the CME Clearing House, the 
Guaranty Fund currently totals approximately 
US$1,800,000,000. Third, in the unlikely event 
that a clearing member were to default and the 
proceeds held in the Guaranty Fund were used 
to cover a shortfall, the DCO will immediately 
take steps to restore its Guaranty Fund to pre-
default levels. (For example, the CME Clearing 
House can require other, non-defaulting clearing 
member firms to increase their Guaranty Fund 
deposits by as much as 2.75 times the amount 
of their security deposits to restore the Fund to 
pre-default levels.) In its history, no CME clear-
ing member firm has ever defaulted but these 
safeguards are designed to provide financial pro-
tections even in times of significant stress in the 
financial markets. These protections are further 
buttressed by the customer margin requirements 
that are established by the futures exchanges and 
by the exchanges’ own market surveillance and 
financial surveillance programs, all of which pro-
vide important customer protections to futures 
customers.
net Capital Requirements
Another customer protection are the financial 
net capital requirements imposed on all broker-
age firms, including FCMs. The minimum “ad-
justed net capital” requirement, from an account-
ing perspective, reflects an amount that equals 
the total of the current liquid assets on the books 
of the FCM in excess of the total amount of its 
liabilities. Most large brokerage firms today are 
registered as both an FCM and as a BD.21
Pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.17, the firm must 
maintain “adjusted net capital” that is equal to or 
greater than the sum of customer (8%) and non-
customer (4%) required margin requirements. In 
the event that the net capital amount determined 
pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.17 is greater than the 
Futures & Derivatives Law Report
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amount required under SEC Rule 15c3-1, the 
firm must meet the greater of these two amounts. 
In determining its minimum net capital require-
ments pursuant to the applicable regulations 
noted above, the firm’s assets must be valued con-
servatively, with most financial assets having their 
value discounted, using value at risk or scenario 
analysis, to provide a conservative assessment of 
their market value. 
Reporting Requirements
Under applicable rules, a broker-dealer/FCM 
must provide the SEC, the CFTC, FINRA, the Na-
tional Futures Association (“NFA”) and its desig-
nated examining authority and its designated self-
regulatory organization (DSRO) (for most large 
U.S. brokerage firms, this would be FINRA in 
their broker-dealer capacity and the CME in their 
FCM capacity) with same-day notice if its regu-
latory capital drops below the “early warning” 
level (a multiple of the net capital requirements 
mandated by SEC Rule 15c3-1 and CFTC Rule 
1.17). Similarly, if at any time the firm’s regula-
tory tentative net capital declines by 20% or more 
from the last month-end, that firm must, in accor-
dance with applicable SEC and CFTC regulations, 
immediately notify these regulators regarding this 
change. The “early warning” requirements effec-
tively provide an advance indication of potential 
financial stress that a broker-dealer/FCM may 
incur and are set significantly above the level at 
which a broker-dealer/FCM must maintain its 
minimum net capital requirements.
The Lehman Events
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. (“LB Holdings”), the holding com-
pany of all Lehman Brothers entities and the pub-
licly-traded company (NYSE symbol: LEH) filed 
a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of Ti-
tle 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code with the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
New York.22 Its principal U.S. subsidiary, Lehman 
Brothers Inc. (“LBI”), a registered broker-dealer 
and FCM, did not file its petition (a Chapter 7 
filing) until the following weekend. The principal 
U.K. affiliate of LB Holdings, Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (“LBIE”), also submitted 
its filing on September 15th. The U.K. Financial 
Services Authority (“FSA”) appointed Price Wa-
terhouse Coopers (“PWC”) as the Administrator 
for LBIE. This is similar to the role of a trustee in 
bankruptcy had LBI made such a filing. 
LBI had opened a Customer Omnibus Ac-
count on the books of LBIE to permit LBI fu-
tures customers to trade on the various European 
exchanges. LBIE was either directly a general 
clearing member firm (“GCM”) on the clearing 
houses in Europe, such as LCH Clearnet SA and 
EUREX Clearing AG, or had established their 
own customer omnibus accounts on the books of 
a third party clearing firm on other European ex-
changes. LBI was the clearing member firm on the 
U.S. futures exchanges and had opened a futures 
customer omnibus account with other Lehman 
Brothers affiliates or third party clearing firms in 
Canada and Asia. LBIE had opened a customer 
omnibus account on the books of LBI to allow its 
futures customers to trade on the U.S., Canadian 
and Asian markets. All futures customer accounts 
were opened with either LBI or LBIE.23 Note that 
LBIE had many direct futures accounts opened 
on its books, including some accounts, especially 
hedge fund accounts, that involved a prime bro-
kerage and cross margin netting arrangement. 
LBI had similar arrangements with hedge funds 
on its books but also had a large number of fu-
tures-only accounts that were managed by large 
investment advisory firms.
As noted above, the concept of segregated 
funds is designed to protect the cash and collat-
eral deposited by futures customers to margin 
their futures positions. These regulations do not 
directly address the actual futures positions them-
selves. Given the uncertainty of the situation and 
the volatility in the marketplace, senior Lehman 
futures officials worked closely with their futures 
clients and governmental and exchange officials 
to transfer the client futures positions to other 
clearing firms in order to provide these customers 
with a new home that was properly capitalized. 
This process started immediately after LB Hold-
ings filed its petition for bankruptcy in the U.S. 
but not so outside the U.S. PWC, as the newly-ap-
pointed Administrator, did not permit the trans-
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fer of the open futures positions until late in the 
day on Wednesday, September 17th, with the vast 
majority of the futures positions being transferred 
on Thursday, September 18th or Friday, Septem-
ber 19th.
Most of the futures positions held by Lehman’s 
customers, whether they were held on the books 
of LBI or LBIE, were either moved to other clear-
ing member firms per the instructions of such 
customers by the close of business on Friday, Sep-
tember 19th, or they became futures customers of 
Barclays Capital Inc. (“BCI”), the U.S. affiliate of 
Barclays Bank PLC. BCI acquired all of the re-
maining futures customer accounts on the books 
of LBI after the close of business on September 
19th. Therefore, the system worked for the most 
part although, as noted above, quicker action was 
needed. Through the tremendous efforts of many 
governmental agencies, SROs, firms, exchanges, 
clearing houses and clients, the goal of transfer-
ring the open futures positions was effectively 
achieved within five days. This reflects the strong 
working relationships that exist within the global 
futures community. No other product area or in-
dustry can make a similar claim.
RECOMMENDATION #3: In the future, it is 
imperative that any trustee in bankruptcy or ad-
ministrator that is selected should have a strong 
futures product knowledge and expertise to al-
low prompt and immediate transfers of futures 
positions. Granted, in today’s marketplace, prime 
brokerage accounts and corresponding Cross 
Margin Netting Agreements (“CMNA”) play a 
critical role relating to the required funding of the 
risk margin amounts that control multiple prod-
ucts, including futures accounts, but many futures 
accounts are stand alone accounts without any 
prime brokerage (“PB”) or CMNA agreements 
in place. Accordingly, the margin amounts held 
in such stand alone accounts will not have been 
used to finance other related financial transac-
tions and products, such as via a PB or portfolio 
margining arrangement. All customer omnibus 
accounts fall within this parameter and must be 
treated differently than other futures accounts 
that are highly correlated with other products and 
PB arrangements. The product expertise for such 
appointees related to futures is critical, and such 
appointees, even if they are only granted certain 
limited powers over futures accounts, must have 
a thorough knowledge of the global futures mar-
kets. Customer protection is the most important 
goal, and futures positions need to be moved in 
a very timely manner, especially during a volatile 
marketplace.
Sadly, some European and Asian exchanges 
took a different path to resolving the issue before 
them. Even though the accounts were labeled as 
customer omnibus accounts on their books, they 
chose to simply liquidate the open futures posi-
tions and not participate in any position trans-
fers. Such liquidations came with little or no prior 
notice to Lehman officials. This should never be 
allowed again.
RECOMMENDATION #4: It is very important 
that every global exchange recognize the concept 
of a customer omnibus account or create a special 
coding on their exchange operational system that 
can easily identify which positions belong to cus-
tomers and which positions belong to the clearing 
member’s proprietary traders. Once positions are 
identified as belonging to a customer of a clearing 
member or their carrying brokers, these customer 
positions should not be liquidated but should be 
allowed to be moved to another firm unless, of 
course, the client seeks such liquidation. The ex-
change is protected financially as it can liquidate 
the clearing firm’s proprietary positions and can 
thus hold these proceeds to protect against a mar-
ket move in the positions held by the customers or 
can even issue an increased margin call. To mere-
ly liquidate open customer positions promptly 
without providing alternative approaches to the 
solution is not an acceptable practice and should 
not be allowed. This is especially troublesome in 
today’s marketplace as a large number of futures 
positions are used to hedge against some stock or 
bond portfolios. By liquidating one leg of these 
positions, given the market volatility that oc-
curred, some clients incurred even greater damage 
to their portfolio. Actions taken by an exchange 
or clearing house to liquidate all customer open 
positions without first providing an opportunity 
to have these positions transferred, even if permit-
ted by their rules, should be guarded and not used 
without greater forethought.
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RECOMMENDATION #5: The CFTC and 
the FSA should consider and establish policies, 
and perhaps regulations, that require any global 
futures exchange that holds positions for custom-
ers of FCMs in the U.S. or registered investment 
entities (“RIEs”) in the U.K. to contact the CFTC 
and the FSA, respectively, before the exchange 
takes actions to liquidate all customer positions. 
The CFTC and the FSA could require, via a 
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”), that 
such exchanges notify them in the event an ex-
change elects to take actions to liquidate all open 
customer positions.
RECOMMENDATION #6: Regulations need 
to be established to provide better customer pro-
tections for the actual positions held by futures 
customers globally. As noted above, current regu-
lations only address the cash and collateral used 
to margin these positions. However, when major 
events occur, like they did over the weekend of 
September 12-14, the resulting market volatility 
caused significant harm to end users who were 
not able to liquidate their open positions. Regu-
lations need to establish proper guidelines and 
procedures that an administrator or trustee in 
bankruptcy must follow to permit the prompt re-
lease of open futures positions that are not part 
of any PB or other risk-based financing arrange-
ment, and to require the exchanges to act accord-
ingly, all in the best interests of the end users of 
the global futures markets.
RECOMMENDATION #7: The global futures 
industry is just one small part of the total invest-
ment landscape. Many products in today’s mar-
ketplace are intertwined within a total risk port-
folio. This reflects the significant growth of prime 
brokerage globally and the growing concept of 
portfolio margining. Because different products 
are so correlated to each other, especially from a 
risk margin and financing perspective, it is very 
important that all of these products be treated 
in a similar manner under new bankruptcy laws 
and regulations that are clearly now needed. Such 
laws and regulations must be adopted globally. 
This requires all of the major countries to meet 
together to address this global problem. A future 
with 15 or 20 different sets of laws and regula-
tions is not a very bright one. While uniformity 
is not needed, commonality of elements and their 
corresponding interpretations are. A global set 
of bankruptcy laws and regulations that relate 
specifically to the insolvency of global brokerage 
firms and banks are now needed.
While open futures positions were, for the most 
part, transferred within the first five days, the cash 
and collateral used to margin those positions were 
not timely transferred. While part of the delay re-
sulted from some difficulty in the accounting and 
trade confirmation processes, some banks simply 
refused to transfer the amounts held in customer 
protected accounts in a timely manner. For ex-
ample, JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, the U.S. bank 
that held all of the cash and collateral in the LBI 
Customer Segregated Account, stopped releasing 
customer funds on Thursday, September 18th and 
continued this “hold” for many more days. Even-
tually, it agreed to transfer the cash and collateral 
held in the Customer Segregated Account.
RECOMMENDATION #8: Actions taken by 
banks that did not release funds in a timely man-
ner were unacceptable.24 There is no probable 
cause to place a “hold” by such banks on segre-
gated funds. Such banks have signed a “segregat-
ed acknowledgement” letter, which clearly states 
that the bank acknowledges and agrees that the 
amounts held in a Customer Segregated Account 
belong solely to the futures customers of the re-
spective FCM and do not belong to any creditors 
of that FCM or custodial bank. By taking such 
actions, banks required the end users, in essence, 
to “double segregate” by depositing new margin 
amounts at their new clearing firms. The addi-
tional funding requirement adversely impacted 
their liquidity performance and return and should 
not have occurred.
RECOMMENDATION #9: The CFTC, NFA, 
FSA and the respective clearing houses should 
carefully review the entire process of account 
movement during stressed situations, establish 
proper guidelines and procedures to require cus-
todial banks, that act in this capacity on behalf 
of futures customers on a global basis, to trans-
fer customer protected funds in a very timely 
manner and take enforcement actions against 
banks that refuse to act in the best interests of 
the customers.
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PWC, the Administrator for LBIE, issued a 
statement on October 7, 2008, stating it was still 
reviewing how to deal with requests for transfer 
of client monies and assets. PWC gave no indica-
tion as to when such client assets would be dis-
tributed. Other firms appointed to serve as the 
trustee in bankruptcy in other jurisdictions have 
also not released any of the funds held in the LBI 
Customer Omnibus Account on the books of 
LBIE and other non-U.S. Lehman affiliates. In Ja-
pan, for example, the bankruptcy-appointed firm 
indicated that it would not announce any deci-
sion regarding releasing the funds held in LBI’s 
customer segregated account until after Novem-
ber 17, 2008.
RECOMMENDATION #10: As noted above, 
the customer omnibus account of a U.S. FCM 
should receive prompt payment of any amounts 
held in such accounts in those countries that the 
CFTC deem to be a good control location over 
customer funds, once the open positions have 
been transferred to another clearing member. The 
CFTC, together with the industry and other for-
eign governmental agencies, need to review these 
procedures and establish new guidelines on how 
such omnibus accounts should be treated. Once 
the open positions held in a customer omnibus 
account have been transferred away, then the 
funds held to margin those positions should be 
promptly transferred back to such customers or 
their new clearing member firms.
RECOMMENDATION #11: Customer funds 
held by a brokerage firm or exchange in a coun-
try that is deemed to be a good secured location 
pursuant to CFTC regulations should not be 
deemed to be subject to the claims of a creditor 
of the brokerage firm that has filed for bankrupt-
cy and should be protected against such claims. 
The CFTC should consider whether a non-US 
exchange, that permits a U.S. FCM to open a cus-
tomer omnibus account on the books of a clear-
ing member firm of that exchange, should be re-
quired to open special bank accounts with a U.S. 
bank or DCO to hold such initial margin within 
the U.S. and be subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code and Part 190 of the CFTC Regulations in 
order to facilitate the transfer of such customer 
funds in a timely manner. 
RECOMMENDATION #12: The CFTC and 
the NFA, together with other governments and 
industry associations, should establish a task 
force that includes members from the industry 
and the end user community to determine what 
new best practices are now needed in the event 
such a global bankruptcy event ever occurs again. 
The last such industry task force was established 
after the Barings collapse in the mid-1990s. 
There has been considerable change in the way 
the industry operates since then, in particular the 
wide-spread use of PB arrangements and new risk 
management analyses for funding a wide array of 
financial products. The new task force should 
consist of a global committee that creates several 
sub-committees, each having jurisdiction and re-
sponsibility over a specific issue or concern.
RECOMMENDATION #13: The current caps 
on FDIC insurance (currently, $100,000)25 and 
SIPC ($500,000) are being reviewed for possible 
increases. The futures industry and the CFTC 
should meet to determine whether an insurance 
program is now needed for futures accounts. 
SIPA specifically excludes futures accounts. How-
ever, in light of the actions taken by some of the 
global exchanges in connection with Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, there is a need to determine whether 
such an insurance program is now viable and can 
be properly funded.
Conclusion
As noted above, the process and procedures 
that followed the filing of Lehman’s bankruptcy 
did not always flow as well as many believed it 
should have. The industry and government need 
to establish a task force that addresses these issues 
and determine what changes and best practices, if 
any, are now needed to minimize the impact on 
customers in the event another such bankruptcy 
ever occurs.
noTES
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“CFTC” stands for the u.s. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, the u.s. governmental 
agency in charge of regulating the u.s. futures 
markets and u.s. industry professionals.
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2. special recognition goes to Acting CFTC 
Chairman walt Lukken, nFA President Dan 
Roth and many other senior CFTC and nFA staff 
members who provided tremendous assistance 
to help the futures customers of Lehman 
Brothers Inc. throughout this period.
3. Another FCm has recently been the subject 
of bankruptcy proceedings. see sentinel 
management Group, Inc. (u.s. Bankruptcy 
Court for the northern District of Illinois, 
eastern Division (Case no. 07 B 14987) but this 
proceeding involved a different set of issues and 
did not involve transactions in futures contracts. 
Bear was taken over by J.P. morgan Bank, with 
the assistance of the Federal Reserve Bank, in 
march 2008.
4.  A broker-dealer must maintain its securities 
customer assets in compliance with the seC’s 
“customer protection rule” (Rule 15c3-3), 
including maintaining cash in a special reserve 
account and maintaining fully paid and excess 
margin securities in a segregated account. In 
general, the securities accounts maintained 
at a BD will receive the benefit of expedited 
administration and the right to recover up to 
us$100,000 in cash or us$500,000 in securities 
if its broker-dealer were to become insolvent. 
under such a scenario, customer assets held 
in a securities account would be administered 
pursuant to a proceeding brought by the 
securities Investor Protection Corporation (sIPC) 
pursuant to the securities Investor Protection 
Act (sIPA). If the BD were also registered as 
an FCm, futures customers should understand, 
however, that sIPA rules specifically exclude 
futures customer accounts and their assets from 
its provisions. most BDs have purchased a surety 
bond that provides protection in excess of the 
amounts provided under sIPC. however, this 
surety bond would, like sIPA, be limited to only 
the broker-dealer securities accounts and would 
not apply to the futures customer assets held by 
a joint BD-FCm. 
5. 7 u.s.C. § 1 et seq.
6. see CFTC Regulations 1.20 and 30.7
7. 7 u.s.C. § 6d(a)(2)
8.  “Good control location” is mainly a term used by 
broker-dealers pursuant to seC regulations but 
its meaning here implies an account established 
in accordance with CFTC regulations.
9. see Interpretative statement issued by the CFTC 
on september 26, 2008, regarding funds related 
to cleared-only contracts.
10. For those jurisdictions (e.g., Germany, hong 
Kong, Korea) that do not provide the standard 
customer asset protection that requires the 
separation of a Firm’s proprietary assets from 
its customer assets, the FCm may deposit a 
corresponding amount of its own capital in a 
good control location, typically in the accounts 
at its respective custodial bank, to reflect the 
amounts as determined in its 30.7 daily secured 
amount calculation (based on the amount for 
that trade date), in its uK FsA segregation daily 
calculation (based on the amount as determined 
on the trade date plus one day) and in its weekly 
15c3-3 weekly calculation. This form of “double 
segregation” provides significant protections to 
an FCm’s futures customers.
11. note that, pursuant to applicable CFTC 
regulations, an FCm is required to deposit 
all customer cash and securities in a customer 
segregated fund account but, in reality, is not 
required to place customer assets in a secured 
amount account. It can elect to use its own 
capital to meet the minimum secured amount 
requirements.
12.  If the FCm is also registered as a broker-
dealer, then these non-regulated accounts are 
maintained in accordance with seC Rule 15c3-
3. The Customer Reserve Formula calculation 
required by seC Rule 15c3-3 is performed 
weekly, typically on each monday reflecting 
the amounts as of the previous Friday’s close 
of business. The assets held in this account can 
not be commingled with the FCm’s proprietary 
funds and are maintained in a designated special 
Custody Account for the “exclusive Benefit of 
Customers” (eBoC Account) at a designated 
custodial bank.
13. see note 4, supra.
14. see CFTC Regulation 1.20 which states in 
essence: “All customer funds shall be separately 
accounted for and segregated as belonging 
to commodity or option customers. such 
customer funds when deposited with any 
bank, trust company, clearing organization or 
another futures commission merchant shall be 
deposited under an account name which clearly 
identifies them as such and shows that they are 
segregated as required by the Act and this part.” 
CFTC Regulation 30.7 contains similar language 
regarding the treatment of foreign futures and 
options secured amount accounts.
15. see CFTC Regulation 1.17.
16. For a more detailed explanation of applicable 
laws and regulations affecting the bankruptcy 
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of an FCm, see subchapter IV of Chapter 7 of 
the u.s. Bankruptcy Code and Part 190 of the 
CFTC Regulations.
17. Pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.25, an FCm may re-
hypothecate customer funds provided that, at 
all times, an equivalent amount of the funds 
being re-hypothecated are maintained in the 
customer segregated account.
18. This view has been expressed by many industry 
observers but is not directly covered by any CFTC 
regulation.
19. The Reserve Fund “broke the buck” in september 
2008, and many other such funds halted 
redemptions for a 7-day period as permitted by 
their prospectus. on september 22, 2008, the 
seC, pursuant to section 22(e) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (the ‘40 Act”) issued an 
order temporarily suspending redemptions and 
postponing payment of shares of two series 
of The Reserve Fund -- The Primary Fund and 
The u.s. Government Fund. on september 29, 
2008, the Board of Trustees of The Reserve 
Fund announced that it would liquidate the 
assets of The Primary Fund. (see Release no. 
28386). see also CFTC staff Interpretative 
Letter issued on september 24, 2008, to Debra 
Kokal, Chairman of the Joint Audit Committee. 
Also, on september 29th, the u.s. Treasury 
Department announced that it was opening 
its Temporary Guarantee Program for money 
market Funds (Press Release hp-1161). In the 
release, the Treasury Department stated that it 
will guarantee the share price of any publicly 
offered eligible public money market fund that 
is regulated under seC Rule 2a-7 under the 1940 
Act for amounts held by shareholders as of 
september 19th.
20. After T+3 days, a capital charge is assessed 
against the FCm for failing to collect the 
required margin amount.
21. A few, including Goldman sachs, morgan stanley 
and merrill Lynch, were also once licensed as a 
consolidated supervisory entity (“Cse”). The 
seC suspended the Cse program on september 
26, 2008. see seC Release 2008-230. A key 
protection to customers is the special regime 
applicable to Cses under the seC’s and CFTC’s 
respective “net capital” rules (seC Rule 15c3-1 
and CFTC Rule 1.17). As a Cse, the firm would 
calculate its net capital requirement pursuant to 
Appendix e to seC Rule 15c3-1, which establishes 
alternative net capital requirements and allows 
the Cse firm to use seC-approved value at risk 
or scenario analysis models to calculate and 
remain in compliance with the seC and CFTC 
net capital requirements. The Cse net capital 
rules effectively require that the Cse firm must 
maintain at least us $500 million in “adjusted 
net capital” and us$1 billion in “tentative net 
capital” in order to continue operations. This 
calculation does not include customer-owned 
securities.
22. Case no. 08-13555. The petition was filed 
following a special meeting of the Board of 
Directors of holdings on september 14, 2008. 
on september 19, 2008, LBI filed a proceeding 
under the securities Investor Protection Act of 
1970 (Case no. 08-01420). see also statement 
issued by sIPC on september 15, 2008. 
23. over this same weekend, merrill Lynch was 
acquired by the Bank of America and American 
International Group (“AIG”) received a $85 
billion loan from the u.s. Treasury. All of these 
events and other similar concerns created huge 
volatility in the global markets all at once. During 
this same period, many banks refused to issue 
credit to other financial institutions, including 
other banks. over the weekend of september 
19-21, 2008, the u.s. Treasury announced its $700 
billion bailout which received Congressional 
approval on october 3, 2008. 
24. section 4d(b) of the CeA states in essence: “It 
shall be unlawful for any person, including but 
not limited to any clearing agency of a contract 
market or derivatives transaction execution 
facility and any depository, that has received 
any money, securities, or property for deposit in 
a separate account as provided in paragraph 2 
of this section, to hold, dispose of, or use any 
such money, securities, or property as belonging 
to the depositing futures commission merchant 
or any person other than customers of such 
futures commission merchant.” 7 u.s.C. § 6d(b).
25. FDIC insurance was increased to $250,000.00 
on a temporary basis through December 2009 
pursuant to the economic stabilization Act of 
2008 passed on october 3, 2008.
